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Article
The Morality of Humanitarian
Interventions1

Per Bauhn*
In this paper I develop an argument to the effect that humanitarian moral interventions,
far from being inconsistent with the normative framework of just war, fit in very well with
the justifying conditions of this framework. The argument develops by considering three
objections against humanitarian military interventions, emanating from just war criteria.
The criteria in question are just authority, just cause, and non-combatant immunity. It
will be argued that while just authority logically depends on just cause and has no
independent argumentative force of its own, the criterion of just cause should be
understood to include a defence of human rights or vital human interests and not only of
national sovereignty. As for the criterion of non-combatant immunity, it will be argued
that the unintended killing or injuring of innocent non-combatants can be dealt with by
means of a modified version of the doctrine of double effect. Moreover, the moral
responsibility for unintended innocent victims of an intervention should rest with the
repressive regimes that made the intervention necessary in the first place. By relating
humanitarian military interventions to the criteria of just war and to human rights, the
argument developed here places the justification of such interventions at the centre of
contemporary moral discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
As soldiers we have been used to moving mountains to protect our own
sovereignty or risks to our way of life. In the future we must be prepared
to move beyond national self-interest to spend our resources and spill our
blood for humanity. We have lived through centuries of enlightenment,
reason, revolution, industrialization, and globalization. No matter how
idealistic the aim sounds, this new century must become the Century of
Humanity, when we as human beings rise above race, creed, colour,
religion and national self-interest and put the good of humanity above the
good of our own tribe. For the sake of the children and of our future. Peux
ce que veux. Allons-y. (Dallaire 2004: 522)
Thus ends Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire’s account of his mission as a UN
Force Commander in Rwanda, at the time of the genocide which cost 800,000 Rwandans
their lives during a few months in 1994. Dallaire’s small unit could do very little to prevent
the ongoing massacres, and he describes in painful detail the frustration resulting from
trying in vain to convince the international community that it should intervene in Rwanda.
Moreover, he had the humiliating experience of having to negotiate on an almost daily
basis with the very perpetrators of the genocide—an experience which he aptly describes as
“shaking hands with the devil.”
Dallaire points to the need for a new conception of military obligation which
centres upon human rights rather than national interest. This in turn implies an extension of
the traditional rules of just war, which regulate when and how a state may engage in
military activities against another state. The need for such an extension is also recognized
in the most recent literature on just war theory. David Fisher, for instance, has argued in
favour of including not only a right, but a duty to intervene among the prescriptions of just
war:
Where there are major abuses of human rights—mass killings
or ethnic cleansing—the consequences are, ex hypothesi, of extreme
gravity. If we know what is happening and can do something to prevent
it but do not do so, we can be judged to have consented to its occurrence.
In such circumstances, and assuming all the just war criteria are met, it is
reasonable to conclude that we have not just a right but a responsibility
to intervene. We have, in that sense, a duty to save the lives of the
innocent. (Fisher 2011: 239)
On the other hand, there are also certain powerful objections against extending the
concept of just war to include humanitarian military interventions—henceforth, HMIs.
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These objections centre around another interpretation of just war theory and its criteria
regarding just authority, just cause, and non-combatant immunity, denying that “all the just
war criteria are met” in the case of HMIs. In this paper, we will argue that these objections
can be overcome, and that HMIs hence are consistent with the principles of just war.
The objections that we will analyse are the following:
(1) The objection from just authority: The government of one state is no
just authority regarding the internal affairs of another state. Hence, it has
no right whatsoever to subject that state and its citizens to a HMI, even if
that HMI is undertaken with a view to protect these citizens’ human
rights or vital human interests.
(2) The objection from just cause: A state is only entitled to go to war to
protect itself against external aggression. This is the only just cause for
war. To engage in a HMI directed against another state, which does not
pose a clear and imminent military threat to one’s own nation, cannot be
described as a case of necessary defence against external aggression.
Hence, the intervening state would, under such circumstances, lack
moral justification for its actions.
(3) The objection from non-combatant immunity: Given the standard
conditions of modern warfare, it is almost inevitable that innocent noncombatants will be killed and injured in the course of a HMI. This
inevitable sacrificing of innocent victims contradicts the moral purpose
of the HMI, which is to protect human rights or vital human interests,
and hence the HMI will be deprived of whatever moral justification it
may have initially had.
We will now go on to discuss these three objections, and in the course of this
discussion we will give reasons for our belief that they can be overcome and that HMIs
may well have a place within the framework of the just war tradition. Moreover, by relating
both HMIs and just war theory to the moral value of maintaining certain basic human
interests or rights, we place the arguments concerning HMIs centrally within the
framework of contemporary moral discourse.

THE OBJECTION FROM JUST AUTHORITY
This objection denies that one state could be a just authority regarding the internal affairs
of another state. It holds that the sovereignty of states limits the right to interfere, even
against governments who oppress their own peoples. Now, the objection from just
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authority seems to be somewhat out of step with contemporary views on state sovereignty
and human rights. The doctrine of non-intervention, associated with the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648 and the emerging national states, has gradually given way to the Era of
Human Rights, epitomized in the UN Declaration of 1948. Although the UN Declaration
did not envisage HMIs for the sake of protecting human rights, it helped to pave the way
for a new conception of the morally legitimate state as one that respects and maintains
human rights. Today the actions of governments and politicians are routinely evaluated
from the point of view of human rights: “Human rights has become the major article of
faith of a secular culture that fears it believes in nothing else” (Ignatieff 2001: 53).
Hence, within the framework of contemporary political theory, a morally
legitimate state is a state which recognizes its citizens as rights-holders. According to a
minimalist conception, a “decent” state need not be a liberal state in the sense that it grants
all its individual citizens equal political rights, but it should recognize their right to a
freedom from slavery and to a “sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure
freedom of religion and thought” (Rawls 1999: 65). According to a more extensive
conception, morally just states are “democratic legal states,” based on laws “that an entire
people of free and equal individuals could possibly agree to; and where these laws are
formulated and imposed through democratic procedures” (Stilz 2009: 95).
Likewise, according to Michael Walzer, what gives credibility to the idea that a
state has a moral right to defend itself against external aggression is the tacit assumption
that the state functions as a protector of the rights to life and liberty of its individual
citizens:
When states are attacked, it is their members who are
challenged, not only in their lives, but also in the sum of things they value
most, including the political association they have made. We recognize
and explain this challenge by referring to their rights. If they were not
morally entitled to choose their form of government and shape the
policies that shape their lives, external coercion would not be a crime; nor
could it so easily be said that they had been forced to resist in selfdefense. Individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the most important
judgments that we make about war.... The rights of states rest on the
consent of their members.... The moral standing of any particular state
depends upon the reality of the common life it protects and the extent to
which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and
thought worthwhile. If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t
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defend the common life that does exist, its own defense may have no
moral justification. (Walzer 2000: 53–54)
Hence, according to Walzer’s argument, a government which oppresses its own
citizens and deprives them of freedom and basic well-being would not be allowed to use
the principle of national sovereignty as a shield against a HMI undertaken by a
neighbouring state. Nor would it be a case of morally legitimate self-defence for such a
government to resist a HMI. Tyrannies simply do not have the same rights as rightsrespecting states: “The protection of the human rights of its members is the key moral task
that grounds the right of a state to coerce its members ... Should a state fail in the
performance of that task, it has no moral standing to stop an outside party from intervening
in order to help rectify the state’s failure” (Altman and Wellman 2008: 233).
However, the above arguments only clarify why an oppressive state has no right to
resist a HMI. It does not settle the question of just authority, that is, the right of another
state to intervene against the oppressive state in the first place.
One possibility here is that the proper just authority is not any individual state, but
rather the international community. After all, HMIs are supposed to protect universal
human rights or vital human interests, and it could be argued that this should be the
concern of some supranational agency rather than any individual political community.
Moreover, we have the United Nations and we have the agreements and conventions
regarding human rights which its member states have signed, and hence it would be only
natural to consider the UN as a just authority when it comes to initiating HMIs.
However, even if the UN in theory would be an excellent supranational just
authority, its track record as a modern Hobbesian Leviathan is less than convincing. This
could be observed during the wars in former Yugoslavia:
The Serbs took UN hostages and there were telephone
negotiations between a Bosnian Serb official and General Michael Rose
of the UN. Jovan Zametica spoke to General Rose in a tone which Hobbes
did not imagine would be used by people addressing Leviathan: ‘Don’t
mess with us, Mike. Don’t fuck with us.’ (Glover 2001: 137)
And, speaking of international agreements, “for those who found the UN debacles
in Bosnia and Rwanda less than satisfying, it is worth reminding ourselves that these
collective humanitarian actions were carried out under the constraints imposed by such
existing agreements and conventions” (Lucas 2003: 84).
Hence, we have to return to the case of a state, unilaterally contemplating a HMI
with the purpose of protecting the human rights or vital human interests of the citizens of
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another state. What legitimate authority can such a state have for intervening in another
state to defend citizens of that state against their own government? Does the legitimate
authority of the intervening state depend on its being democratic, respecting its own
citizens’ human rights or vital human interests? Or can HMIs be undertaken justifiably also
by undemocratic states?
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia that ended the rule of Pol Pot and the
Khmer Rouge in 1979 was not initiated by a democratic government, nor were the
Cambodians asked to give their consent to it. Still, given the murderous brutality of the
Khmer Rouge and the prospects for a more democratic and peaceful development in
Cambodia following their downfall, few people would be morally concerned about the
interference with Cambodian state sovereignty brought about by the Vietnamese invaders.
Moreover, looking at cases of domestic law and order, it likewise seems that in our moral
deliberations factors pertaining to the need for an interpersonal intervention, and the
expected consequences (for human rights or vital human interests) of intervening as
compared to not intervening, are given priority over questions regarding who has the
formal or legal right to intervene:
Even police are morally permitted to resort to violence only to
defend themselves or to protect third parties; that is, the use of violence is
not legitimated in advance, but must be justified in each case as a last
resort which prevents a greater harm. On the other hand, it is morally
permissible and perhaps sometimes required for ordinary citizens to use
violence under similar circumstances, even though ordinary citizens do
not have legitimated authority to enforce the law. If a person or group of
people is able to prevent a rape by restraining and hurting the would-be
rapist, for example, they are justified in doing so. (Young 2003: 264)
Just authority in the case of HMIs hence seems to be derived from just cause
rather than constituting an independent criterion. If it is morally right to intervene, that is, if
there is a just cause for an intervention, even an undemocratic government may be a just
authority of this particular HMI, although it may not be a just authority in relation to its
own citizens and regarding other specific policies and actions. On the other hand, if it is
morally wrong to intervene, that is, in the absence of a just cause for an intervention, not
even a perfectly democratic government, although it is a just authority in relation to its own
citizens, can be a just authority of this particular HMI. This brings us to the question of
when it is morally right or even morally necessary to intervene, that is, to the question of
just cause.
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THE OBJECTION FROM JUST CAUSE
This objection holds that HMIs lack just cause, since they involve the use of military force
against another state without there being a threat against the political sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the intervening state. The presumption behind the objection is that
self-defence is the only possible just cause for a military intervention against another state.
Now, it could be argued that HMIs might be considered as a form of preventive
self-defence, since oppressive regimes are not to be trusted as regards their peaceful
intentions. The aggression they direct against their own citizens could easily be extended to
neighbouring states, destabilizing peace and order in international relations. (One could
think of the activities of Nazi Germany in the inter-war era, as well as of the activities of
North Korea today.) Hence, the lesson to learn would be that “[o]utlaw states are
aggressive and dangerous; all peoples are safer and more secure if such states change, or
are forced to change, their ways” (Rawls 1999: 81).
However, even if this presumption is valid in many cases, it does not hold for all
of them. Sometimes the oppressive governments against which HMIs are directed
constitute no threat whatsoever to the intervening state, neither now, nor in the foreseeable
future. More important, whether HMIs can be part of a strategy of self-defence or not is
irrelevant, since the defining purpose of HMIs is different. HMIs are undertaken for the
sake of protecting universal human rights or vital human interests, not for the sake of
national self-defence.
Returning to the question of just cause, we have already noted Michael Walzer’s
argument that the right of a state to defend itself depends on its willingness to defend its
individual citizens’ rights to life and liberty. This argument could be extended to include a
justification of HMIs. Since we may assume that rights to life and liberty are just as
important to members of other political communities as they are to us, why would it be
wrong for us to defend their rights as well—even against their own government?
Now, one objection to this line of arguing would be that from the fact that a state
which protects its own citizens’ rights or important interests has the right to defend itself, it
does not follow that such a state is also morally justified in intervening to protect the rights
or interests of citizens of other states. It is one thing to establish a state’s right to selfdefence. It is quite another thing to establish a state’s right to interfere in the internal affairs
of another state. After all, it could be argued that while states are indeed morally obliged to
look after the rights of their own citizens, they are not morally required to try to force other
states to respect the rights of their citizens. According to this line of argument, the
requirements of justice do not apply to international relations. And if they do not, “liberal

30 Per Bauhn
states are not obliged either to tolerate nonliberal states or to try to transform them, because
the duties of justice are essentially duties to our fellow citizens” (Nagel 2005: 135). Hence,
from the just cause of self-defence, we cannot infer a just cause of intervention. Since this
assumption regarding the absence of requirements of justice in international relations is an
important objection to HMIs, we will analyse it in a more detailed manner below.

THE REALIST OBJECTION TO HMIS
Those who object to the idea that the purpose of protecting the rights or interests of the
citizens of another state could constitute a just cause for a HMI need not deny the expected
causal efficiency of the intervention. That is, they may well agree that a HMI indeed would
bring about more decent conditions of life for the oppressed citizens of the state targeted by
the intervention. But they may still think that this is not sufficient to justify a HMI.
This would be the position of the political realists, who reject all kinds of moral
idealism in international affairs and who believe that any government should give priority
to the national interest of its own political community and not intervene in any other state’s
affairs unless this furthers the national interest. Now, political realists need not deny that
moral considerations as a matter of fact do influence the decisions of governments and
politicians, or that moral considerations might be consistent with the national interest. A
conception of such a “moralised realism” has been outlined by Rory Conces (Conces 2009:
103–109). However, when it comes to justifying political decisions, political realists will
hold that the national interest should be decisive.
According to political realists, moral reasons may well guide interpersonal actions
within a particular nation. But between nations “there is no common moral standard, no
mutually accepted procedure for reaching moral conclusions, and no common judiciary for
enforcing moral judgments” (Lackey 1989: 1). Sometimes this idea seems to be a rather
thin cover for a nationalist contempt for ideas of universalism in ethics, similar to the
attitude expressed by Hermann Göring:
What the devil do you mean, morality?—word of honor? Sure,
you can talk about word of honor when you promise to deliver goods in
business.—But when it is the question of the interests of the nation!? ...
Then morality stops! (Holmes 1989: 50)
Sometimes, however, political realism is more of a policy of caution, expressing
fear for the fate of a nation whose politicians are guided by blind idealism. Henry
Kissinger’s retrospective analysis of U.S. involvement in Vietnam voices this attitude:
In Kissinger’s view ... the disaster that befell America in
Vietnam had its origin in ‘a naive idealism that wanted to set right all the
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world’s ills and believed American goodwill supplied its own efficacy’
(...). As a result America found itself involved in a war that it ‘knew
neither how to win nor how to conclude’ (...). (Coates 1997: 23)
Unfortunately for the realist argument, it is marred with problems, one of which is
that it lacks consistency. To begin with, what ground could be given for promoting the
national interest other than the fact that doing so is beneficial to those individuals who
together constitute one’s nation? There is no mystical national “organism” to be found
here, which may possess an interest independently of the interests of all those individual
members who together form the collective called “the nation”. The nation as a collective
organism, a “corps moral et collectif,” as Rousseau put it (Rousseau 1966: 52), is a
philosophical fiction. No nation can have an existence that goes beyond the existence of its
individual members. When the last of the Mohicans is dead, so is the Mohican nation. And
what passes for the actions and destiny of a nation is in fact what its members, or their
leaders, or the most influential among them, do in the name of the nation: “The actions of
states are, after all, reducible to the actions of people” (Lackey 1989: 2). And, as Michael
Walzer pointed out above, what gives credibility to the idea that a state has a moral right to
defend itself against external aggression is the tacit assumption that the state functions as a
protector of the rights to life and liberty of its individual citizens.
Hence, the rights of states, which play an important part in the realist argument,
seem to imply the more basic moral rights or interests of individuals, and these rights or
interests in turn cannot depend for their justification on citizenship in a particular state,
since that would make the argument circular—states would then be justified by reference to
the rights and interests of individuals, and these rights and interests would in turn be
justified by reference to the individuals’ membership in states. Hence, the ideal of
promoting the national interest cannot be separated from the need to recognize the moral
rights or interests of individuals. And since there is no good reason to suppose that
individual members of other nations would differ from one’s fellow nationals with respect
to their having certain moral rights or certain morally important interests, the advocate of
states as possessors of rights must, on pain of inconsistency, recognize a universalist
morality. Hence, political realism, as it usually presents itself, seems to be logically
inconsistent, as it denies at the level of international relations those very rights or interests
which its justification at the domestic level requires.
We have now, by way of an analysis of the basic assumptions of political realism,
arrived at the conclusion that the human rights or basic human interests which justify state
protection at the domestic level should also justify protection at the international level.
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Hence, maintaining and defending human rights at the international level may constitute a
just cause for HMIs.

THE MORAL DUTY TO INTERVENE AND ITS LIMITS
Now, given that we accept a universalist morality and that the protection of the rights or
important interests of citizens of states other than our own may justify HMIs, there remains
the question of exactly what is implied by such a justification. We may have established
that we have a moral right to intervene in another state for the sake of safeguarding the
rights or important interests of its citizens. Do we also have a moral duty to launch a HMI
(assuming that a HMI would succeed in the aim of bringing an end to oppression)? Given
that we, too, have rights or important interests that we need to protect, what kind of
sacrifices can be legitimately asked of us for the sake of relieving another nation of
oppression?
The answers to these questions will depend on one’s choice of ethical theory as
well as on the specific character of the situation at hand. A utilitarian, for instance, would
refer to the basic principle of creating the greatest net happiness possible for the greatest
number, and then try to establish whether this principle, given the situation at hand, is or is
not best approximated by a HMI, comparing the expected gains and losses in happiness for
all persons concerned if the HMI is launched with the effects on their net happiness if the
HMI is not launched.
Factors to be considered in such a calculation include the lives lost and the lives
spared due to a successful HMI against a brutal dictatorship, lives lost and spared due to
not intervening against that dictatorship, the effects on the general happiness of a failed
HMI, the general chances of success or failure of a HMI, and so on. It could also be argued
from a utilitarian point of view that a government which contemplates an intervention
should make sure that it enjoys domestic support for what it intends to do, in order not to
deprive itself of its citizens’ trust, which also constitutes an important good to be included
in the happiness calculus. In the words of the utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick:
For a state to embark on a career of international knighterrantry would, generally speaking, be hardly more conducive to the
interests of the civilized world than to those of the supposed Quixotic
community. Still I admit that cases may occur in which intervention of
this kind, at a cost or risk to the intervening community beyond what
strict self-regard could justify, would be clearly advantageous to the
world, and that in such cases the “quasi-trusteeship” attaching to the
position of government might render its duty doubtful. It would seem
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that in a case of this kind the moral responsibility for public conduct is
properly transferred in a large measure from the rulers to the ruled. The
government may legitimately judge that it is right to run a risk with the
support of public opinion which it would be wrong to run without it ....
(Sidgwick 1998: 45–46)
The contemporary utilitarians Nicholas Fotion and Gerard Elfstrom likewise note
that “sometimes nations will have the obligation to initiate war on behalf of ... citizens from
other nations”, citing Cambodia under Pol Pot and Uganda under Idi Amin as examples of
tyrannically governed states that were justly invaded by their neighbours. However, Fotion
and Elfstrom are also careful to point out that “[i]ntervention into another nation’s internal
affairs is ... likely to be met with great resistance and be costly in terms of human and
material destruction,” and that such interventions “can be justified only when special
circumstances exist” (Fotion and Engstrom 1986: 115).
Now all this seems reasonable enough: we should not risk the lives of people, be
they our fellow citizens or the citizens of another nation, for just any flimsy ideal of global
justice and regardless of the prospects of success. Most importantly, we should not run all
the risks involved in a military intervention unless it is indeed necessary to intervene to end
oppression in another state. If we could end oppression just as efficiently with less risky
means, we should of course do so.
However, the utilitarian calculus may give little comfort to oppressed minorities
whose very minority position may make their interests negligible from a utilitarian point of
view. If we should belong to such a minority we may well ask ourselves: “[H]ow can we
argue with assurance that everyone would be better off if our rights were more fully
recognized? The society might be better off without us” (Dyck 2005: 46).
Now, even if we reject the ideal of maximizing net happiness and accept that all
persons have rights to life and liberty that should be respected regardless of whether this
satisfies a utilitarian calculus or not, we may still come to the conclusion that not all
persons are equally entitled to our government’s assistance. We may recognize that there
are indeed such things as human rights and, sharing with Thomas Jefferson the belief that
“to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men” (Jefferson 1994: 24),
conclude that the supreme purpose of our government is to protect our rights.
Hence, whatever obligations our government has to support the rights of citizens
of other nations, these obligations cannot be allowed to override its obligation to maintain
our similar rights. Just as a bad swimmer will not be morally required to risk his life for the
purpose of trying to save a drowning man, so a nation with limited resources will not be
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required to jeopardize its independence and the well-being of its citizens, trying to protect
the citizens of another nation against the overwhelming might of a ruthless and well-armed
dictatorship. The morality of human rights implies an equality of rights between agents and
their recipients, not a self-sacrifice on behalf of the agents.
The morality of human rights should be understood as an egalitarian morality, in
the sense that it prescribes that all humans should be equal in their possession of certain
important goods, such as life, liberty, and security. It is also Kantian, in the sense that it
entails that no person or group should be reduced to a mere means to the ends of another
person or group. Hence, there should be limits to the sacrifices that can be demanded of us
in the name of human rights. Consequently, states and nations are not required to endanger
the basic rights of their own citizens for the sake of relieving other political communities of
their oppressors. However, the fact that a nation is unable to successfully intervene on its
own to help people in need does not mean that it is entitled to passivity. The morality of
human rights requires of nations that they should do their best to join forces with each other
to gather the strength sufficient for protecting human rights at a global level.
Hence, while the argument from universal human rights supports the idea of HMIs
for the sake of protecting the basic rights to life and liberty of oppressed groups, it also
gives room for considering the rights of those individuals and states that are called upon to
initiate the HMIs in question. This double consideration is clearly brought out in what is
probably the most sophisticated contemporary argument for human rights. We are here
referring to the argument developed by Alan Gewirth, taking its point of departure in the
generic features of successful agency—defined by Gewirth as freedom and well-being—
which all agents logically must claim as their rights, and culminating in the Principle of
Generic Consistency (PGC), according to which we should act in accordance with these
generic rights of our recipients as well as of ourselves:
There are kinds of extreme crisis situations where the joint
efforts of governments and individuals are required. When tyrannical
regimes set out to murder parts of their populations, as in the Nazis’
Holocaust and the “ethnic cleansing” perpetrated in the former
Yugoslavia in 1993, it is a human-rights obligation of governments to
condemn such policies and to take whatever steps they can to protect the
oppressed groups. Here the community of rights requires an
overstepping of national boundaries and an effective recognition and
enforcement of the universality of human rights.... We have duties to
help persons to fulfill their generic rights of agency when they cannot do
so by their own efforts. Through such fulfillment, persons are enabled to

Morality of Humanitarian Interventions

35

act, with general chances of success, in pursuit of their own purposes,
whatever they may be, so long as they do not violate the generic rights of
other persons. But by the same token, the helpers, the respondents of the
duties, should also be able to act in pursuit of their own purposes, in
accordance with their own rights to freedom and well-being. An
accomodation must, then, be reached between persons’ duties to help
others and their rights to be free purposive agents on their own behalf.
This accomodation is indicated in the PGC’s injunction to act in accord
with the generic rights of one’s recipients as well as of oneself. (Gewirth
1996: 60–62)
Hence, not only is the protection of human rights a just cause for HMIs, but it may
occasionally be a moral duty for states to intervene in other states for the sake of preventing
or ending violations of human rights. However, this duty is conditional. A HMI should be
undertaken only if it is indeed necessary and only if it can be undertaken without risking
any comparable loss of rights or important interests among the citizens of the intervening
state. There should also be a reasonable chance that the intervention will be successful.
Otherwise it would just be a waste of human and material resources. What counts as
success is of course a matter of dispute. Should we aim for a perfect democracy with equal
political rights for everyone, or should we settle for a melioration of present conditions,
abolishing torture camps and releasing political prisoners? Should this be done within one
year? Five years? Ten years? At what maximum cost? We should not expect that there will
be agreement regarding what counts as a successful HMI. But we should expect from
democratic and responsible governments that they give us an honest picture of the purpose
and estimated costs of any HMI that they propose to undertake, so that we will be able to
judge for ourselves how well the actual results of a HMI correspond to its professed goals.

THE OBJECTION FROM NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY
This is the objection that since any HMI, like any other military operation, is likely to bring
with it the killing and injuring of innocent victims, HMIs cannot be morally justified. A
HMI undertaken for the sake of securing objects of basic rights or interests, like life and
liberty, cannot, according to this objection, retain its moral validity if the necessary means
to its realization involve violating these very rights or interests.
This objection, however, assumes too rigid a view of a morally justified HMI. The
precept “do no harm,” which is implied by this view, “is not a viable maxim in a world
where dirty hands are the inevitable consequences of action” (Brown 2003: 45) and where
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inaction may be morally impermissible. To act according to the rule that one must never,
regardless of the consequences, act in a way that may possibly harm innocent lives, will
effectively immobilize most armed operations against tyrannical governments. At the same
time it will convince tyrants, who themselves do not hesitate to kill and torture innocent
people among their own citizens, that the leaders of democratic states are too weak and soft
to do anything drastic about the situation.
We should note that “innocent,” in the context of just war theory, should be
understood as “currently harmless” and as opposed to “doing harm” rather than to “being
guilty” (Nagel 1979: 70). We are not assuming that the innocent, as persons, are guiltless
and good. They may be wife-beaters, tax-evaders, and polluters of the environment. But
they may still be innocent in relation to the context that matters to the military operation at
hand, in this case a HMI, in the sense that they are not involved in any activity that
endangers the success of this operation. However, the category of the innocent, while being
equivalent to that of the non-combatant, is not the same as that of the civilian. Although
civilians typically are non-combatants, not all of them are. Political leaders and government
officials who direct and supervise the armed operations of their country may technically be
civilians, in the straightforward sense that they wear no uniforms, but their role in the war
effort makes them definitely combatants. (As regards this category, it has indeed been
argued that “those most responsible for wars are usually least involved in the actual killing”
(Holmes 1989: 185).) The same goes for workers in munitions factories. However, as
Michael Walzer has pointed out, we must distinguish between those civilians who produce
specifically for the war effort, and those who produce for the general needs of society:
When it is militarily necessary, workers in a tank factory can be
attacked and killed, but not workers in a food processing plant. The
former are assimilated to the class of soldiers—partially assimilated, I
should say, because these are not armed men, ready to fight, and so they
can be attacked only in their factory (not in their homes), when they are
actually engaged in activities threatening and harmful to their enemies.
The latter, even if they process nothing but army rations, are not
similarly engaged. They are like workers manufacturing medical
supplies, or clothing, or anything else that would be needed, in one form
or another, in peacetime as well as war. (Walzer 2000: 146)
What morality requires of those in charge of a HMI is that they should not
intentionally bring about the harming or killing of innocent people. While it may be
impossible to avoid harming or killing innocent people as a side-effect of an attack on a
legitimate military target (for instance, an enemy head-quarter situated close to a civilian
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residential area), it should never be the intended purpose of an attack to harm or kill
innocent people. A morally justified way of waging war targets people according to what
they do as enemy combatants or organizers of enemy combatants, but not according to who
they are in terms of the national identity they share with the enemy combatants. This is
what distinguishes morally just warfare from acts of terrorism.
Hence, an act of war may be morally justified, even if it causes innocent deaths,
provided that these deaths were not the intended effect, but only the unintended side-effect
of that act (which may or may not have been foreseen). This is the famous doctrine of
double effect. However, as Richard Norman has pointed out, some principle of
proportionality is needed to balance the number of unintended innocent deaths against the
moral value of the legitimate intended target:
[T]he doctrine of double effect does not mean that unintended
consequences do not matter. It does not mean that an action can be
justified no matter how many unintended deaths of innocent persons it
may bring about. Unintended side-effects are still subject to other moral
limitations, such as the requirement of proportionality.... One could not,
for example, bomb a target of only slight military importance, killing
nearby civilians in huge numbers, and claim that their deaths did not
matter because they were unintended. What the doctrine of double effect
does is make it possible to apply an absolutist standard to the intended
action and its intended consequences, while applying a consequentialist
standard to the unintended consequences. (Norman 1995: 84)
Moreover, the doctrine of double effect itself needs to be made more stringent as
regards the intentions of the agents of a HMI. As it stands, it only requires of these agents
that they should not intend to harm or kill innocent people. But this does not go very far in
the direction of avoiding innocent casualties. For P not to intend x is not for P to intend
not-x. Hence, Michael Walzer has suggested that the negative intentional requirement of
the doctrine of double effect should be supplemented by a positive one, and that the
doctrine accordingly should say not only what soldiers should not intend, but also what
they should intend:
Double effect is defensible, I want to argue, only when the two
outcomes are the product of a double intention: first, that the “good” be
achieved; second, that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as
possible.... Simply not to intend the death of civilians is too easy; most
often, under battle conditions, the intentions of soldiers are focused
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narrowly on the enemy. What we look for in such cases is some sign of a
positive commitment to save civilian lives.... And if saving civilian lives
means risking soldiers’ lives, the risk must be accepted. (Walzer 2000:
155–56)
Hence, the soldiers of a justified HMI should not only aim at not harming noncombatants, but they should aim at protecting non-combatants from being harmed by their
operations. However, there are, as Walzer recognizes, justified limits also to these harmpreventing efforts. Soldiers should be prepared to take some risks for the sake of avoiding
non-combatant casualties, but they are not required to let themselves be wiped out without
resistance or to cease attacking enemy strongholds just for the sake of avoiding harm to
non-combatants.
Moreover, it could be argued that those non-combatants who are the expected
beneficiaries of a morally justified HMI, that is, the oppressed individuals for whose sake
the HMI is undertaken in the first place, should accept certain sacrifices. After all, their
lives were already at risk before the HMI, and some of them would, in all likelihood, be
killed by their own repressive government if there had not been a HMI. Hence, it would not
be unfair for the intervening army to expose these oppressed non-combatants to certain
risks “provided that the action’s reduction of the risks they face from the original threat
exceeds the risks to which the action itself exposes them” (McMahan 2010: 360).
After all, we are talking of a morally justified HMI and of unintended noncombatant casualties. We are not requiring of a justified HMI that it must never cause any
harm to non-combatants. “War necessarily places civilians in danger; that is another aspect
of its hellishness. We can only ask soldiers to minimize the dangers they impose” (Walzer
2000: 156).

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND NECESSITY
Now, if a certain HMI is indeed necessary to end a brutal dictatorship, it could be argued
that the unintended and unavoidable deaths of non-combatants that will be caused by the
soldiers in charge of the HMI in question should be morally attributed to the dictatorship
which made the HMI necessary in the first place. While the soldiers of the HMI are
causally responsible for these deaths, the dictatorship is morally responsible for them. If an
arsonist sets a house on fire, and the fire-brigade, while trying to enter the house by tearing
down a wall, accidentally kills an unconscious person lying on the floor close to the wall, it
is the arsonist who is morally responsible for this person’s death, although it was the firebrigade’s action of tearing down the wall that actually caused his death. As with the case of
a morally justified HMI, the intervention of the fire-brigade is necessary both causally and
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morally, and the moral responsibility for the unintended deaths and injuries in the course of
such interventions should rest with those agents who by their misdeeds created this double
necessity in the first place.
In this context we should note a slightly different way of shifting the burden of
moral responsibility for the unintended deaths of non-combatants from the soldiers with
just cause, who are causally responsible for their deaths, to the unjust rulers against which
these soldiers are fighting. F. M. Kamm suggests that “citizens of a country are liable for
having risks and harms imposed on them in order that their country not be unjust” (Kamm
2004: 682). The point is that since citizens share a responsibility for the activities that their
state undertakes to promote its interests, and since states are under an obligation not to
promote their interests at the expense of the legitimate interests of other states, citizens
must bear the costs for seeing to it that their state does not inflict injustice on other states.
They should rather accept harm for themselves than letting their state unjustly inflict harm
on the citizens of another country. This may involve, in Kamm’s example, having a
backfiring missile sent off, even if it will kill some of one’s fellow national noncombatants, for the sake of destroying another missile that otherwise would kill people
across the border. Likewise, Kamm goes on to argue, in the case of a just war against an
unjust aggressor state, the unintended deaths of non-combatants in that state could be put
down as the price its citizens have to pay to make their state just:
In inter-nation relations, there is often no international agency
that will enforce the duties of one state relative to another. And,
arguably, when that is the case, a state may itself try to enforce duties
owed to it. Hence, when the just state conducts tactical bombing against
the unjust state, knowing that noncombatants will suffer as a side effect,
the just state may be seen as permissibly imposing risks and losses that
the opponent state should be willing to impose on its own people to do
what prevents its own injustice. (Kamm 2004: 684)
While we may agree that the burden of moral responsibility should be shifted
from the just state (or, in the case that we are discussing, the agents of a justified HMI) to
the unjust state, we will disagree with Kamm’s way of reasoning since it does not seem to
distinguish between non-combatant citizens of an unjust state and the rulers of that state as
regards their moral responsibility. According to Kamm, the non-combatant victims of
justified military violence should recognize that their victimization is the price they have to
pay for living in an unjust state and for making that state a just one. But this comes
dangerously close to saying that these non-combatant victims have only themselves to
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blame for being unintentionally killed, or at least that they have no legitimate ground for
complaint when they are being unintentionally killed by the agents of a morally justified
HMI. It would be preferable to see these non-combatant victims as people who indeed have
a legitimate complaint—but against their unjust rulers, not against the agents of the morally
justified HMI. The non-combatant citizens of a state, the brutal dictatorship of which has
made a HMI morally necessary, are indeed victims—namely, of that brutal dictatorship.
The moral necessity of the HMI as a response to the violations of basic human rights or
interests by the dictatorship, in combination with the practical impossibility of avoiding the
unintended harming or killing of non-combatants in the course of the HMI, make these
unfortunate non-combatants the indirect victims of the dictatorship. The moral
responsibility for the injuries and deaths inflicted on them hence rests with their rulers who
made the HMI morally necessary in the first place, and this holds although it is the agents
of the morally justified HMI who are causally responsible for these injuries and deaths.

CONCLUSION
We have analysed three objections emanating from just war theory against HMIs. The first
objection claimed that there could be no just authority for a HMI, since no state is morally
authorized to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state. We found that the objection
from just authority has no independent force of its own, but depends for its strength on
arguments about just cause.
The second objection denied that there could be any such just cause for HMIs,
since only the necessity of national self-defence can justify military action, and HMIs are
not motivated by the need for such a self-defence, at least not primarily. By way of an
analysis of the arguments of political realism, we arrived at the conclusion that the realist
rejection of international morality rests on a contradictory view of moral rights. Hence, it
should be possible to move beyond ideas of national interest and the right to national selfdefence, and to consider the prevention or ending of violations of human rights in another
state as a just cause for a HMI. However, although HMIs may be morally justified (in the
sense that they have a just cause), it does not follow that they always are morally
mandatory. Any government contemplating a HMI should make sure that the intervention
in question is consistent with its duty to protect its own citizens’ human rights or vital
interests.
As for the third objection, about HMIs being inconsistent with non-combatant
immunity, we have argued that the unintended killing or injuring of innocent noncombatants can be dealt with by means of a modified version of the doctrine of double
effect. Moreover, the moral responsibility for unintended innocent victims of a morally
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justified HMI should rest with the oppressor regime that made the HMI necessary in the
first place. We have also argued that it is not unfair to expose the intended beneficiaries of
a HMI, that is, the oppressed citizens of the state against which the HMI is directed, to
some risks in connection with the HMI in question. Hence, to sum up, far from being
inconsistent with just war theory, HMIs fit in very well with the normative framework of
that theory. In fact, by relating the criteria and principles of just war to human rights, the
justification of HMIs places just war theory firmly at the centre of contemporary moral
discourse.

NOTE
1. This essay is a revised and updated version of Bauhn 2007.
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